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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the political reasoning behind the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and France’s decisions to get involved in an intervention in Libya and their 
ultimate desire to ask the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to get 
involved. The political reasoning for the three countries’ decisions varied from 
wanting to obtain political capital in an election year to wanting to avoid a humanitarian 
crisis, especially in a location so close to Europe’s southern border. NATO had 
its own political reasoning for its involvement, which included the desire to 
prevent the alliance from fracturing in a time of defense cuts and to prevent 
coalitions from forming that could undermine the long-term health of the alliance. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The 2011 intervention against Libya by NATO is the most recent operation that the 
alliance has conducted where the majority of the alliance came together to conduct 
offensive operations against an adversary.1 The operation was deemed a military success 
as the alliance was able to bring a formidable force to bear and fulfill the mandate of United 
Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973, which was to protect the citizens of 
Libya from suffering a humanitarian crisis at the hands of Libya’s leader, Muammar al-
Qaddafi.2 In the leadup to the intervention, members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) held different opinions regarding whether their respective countries 
should get involved. This thesis will answer the question of what were the political reasons 
for France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and ultimately NATO to get involved 
in Libya?  
A. THE LIBYA CRISIS AND A CALL FOR ACTION 
In February 2011, news of a rebellion against the Libyan government started 
circulating. The United States and its European allies learned that the Libyan regime had 
been conducting atrocities against those involved in the revolt.3 The rebellion, which drew 
inspiration from similar uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt amid the so-called Arab Spring, 
was initially expected to remain a peaceful protest against the Qaddafi regime.4 However, 
Qaddafi did not follow the lead of his counterparts in Tunisia and Egypt (who decided to 
step down) and instead responded with force against the rebellion.5  
 
1 “’We Answered the Call’ – the End of Operation Unified Protector,” NATO, November 7, 2011, 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_80435.htm 
2 Resolution 1973, United Nations Security Council, 2011. 
https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/1973%20(2011) 
3 Derek Chollet and Ben Fishman, “Who Lost Libya?” Foreign Affairs 94, no. 3 (Mau/June 2015): 
254, http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/1674235074?accountid=12702 
4 Ivo H. Daalder and James G. Stavridis, “NATO’s Victory in Libya,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 2 
(March/April 2012): 2. 
5 Daalder and Stavridis, 2. 
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On March 19, 2011, upon obtaining authorization from the United Nations (UN), a 
coalition comprising the United States, France, Great Britain, and nine other nations 
(including seven NATO members) began offensive operations against the Qaddafi 
regime.6 After destroying Qaddafi’s air defense system and stopping his forces from 
attacking Benghazi and Misrata (which gave the rebels a safe haven to operate from), the 
coalition began to plan for the next phase of the operation.7 With the other participating 
NATO members beginning to take the majority of the strike missions, the U.S. elected to 
ask NATO to take over the command and control role (with U.S. military leadership 
involved via their appointments to NATO) while U.S. forces largely assumed a supporting 
role in the conflict.8  
The decision to have NATO eventually assume command and control had been 
made shortly after the passing of UNSCR 1973. When NATO assumed these roles, the 
United States could remain involved in the operation and hold influence, while not having 
to commit strike assets to military operations.9 The desire to have NATO take control was 
shared by other NATO members, specifically Great Britain.10 However, this desire was 
not shared by all NATO members11 France, which had rejoined the integrated military 
structure of the alliance in 2008 after a 42-year absence, initially wanted to have a 
consortium of willing countries, rather than NATO, conduct the operations against al-
Qaddafi.12 As Mueller et al. observe in Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan 
Civil War, France wanted the consortium to become, “a guiding political body for military 
operations, circumventing the alliance altogether. At the same time, they sought to 
minimize the influence of countries such as Turkey that were reticent about the 
 
6 Karl P. Mueller et al., Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War, RR 676 (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2015), 20-23. 
7 Mueller et al., Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War, 23. 
8 Daalder and Stavridis, “NATO’s Victory in Libya,” 3. 
9 Mueller et al., Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War, 24. 
10 Mueller et al., 25. 
11 Mueller et al., 25. 
12 Mueller et al., 25. 
3 
operation.”13 In addition, such other countries as Germany and Poland had reservations 
about the operations and asked not to participate militarily.14 Germany’s decision to 
abstain stemmed largely from its concern about getting involved in another conflict due to 
its heavy presence in Afghanistan at the time, and from the increasingly frustrated domestic 
opinion of its military conducting offensive operations overseas .15 In the end, the NATO 
operation that ensued, Operation Unified Protector (OUP), was led by NATO 
Headquarters, with the United Kingdom and France taking over most of the offensive 
operations once the U.S. shifted to a supporting role.  
This situation paved the way for a new political aspect to operations that had not 
previously occurred, namely an operation being led by European nations with European 
equipment (a longtime goal of the European member and longtime desire of the United 
States).16 The shift toward the European member’s taking a lead operationally was a new 
dynamic to NATO operations, while still operating under NATO’s established chain of 
command.  
While NATO ultimately ended up assuming command and control of the 
intervention in Libya, the sequence of events leading up to its assumption of this role begins 
with the question: What was the political reasoning that compelled the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and France to intervene in Libya and ultimately leverage the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to also get involved in a conflict with Libya in 2011, 
even though the campaign was launched without full U.S. commitment and proceeded 
without the participation of several major European NATO partners?  
 
13 Mueller et al., 25. 
14 Mueller et al., Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War, 25-29. 
15 Kent Oglesby, “Germany, NATO’s Out-of-Area Operations, and the CSDP: The German Defense 
Policy Dilemma,” (master’s thesis, University of Washington, 2014), 33-34. 
https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/26779/Oglesby_washington_0250O
_13224.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y 
16 Uwe Hartmann, personal communication, March 7, 2021. 
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B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The shift by the European NATO members toward more autonomy from the United 
States begins with the age-old question within NATO of how does burden sharing and 
burden shifting impact the alliance. This literature review seeks to provide an 
understanding of the role that burden sharing and burden shifting has on the politics within 
NATO and what has occurred in years since the conclusion of operations in Libya. Burden 
sharing is the principle of having each member of the alliance provide the necessary money 
and military equipment to contribute to the overall military strength of the alliance.17 
Burden shifting is the process of persuading another member of the alliance to step up to 
fill deficiencies, so the original country does not have to.18 This literature review will 
further discuss burden sharing and burden shifting while also discussing how it works and 
how it maintains the alliance. The writings of the following authors will be used to discuss 
these topics: Walther Thies, Anke Richter and Natalie Webb, Donald Abenheim and Marc-
Andre Walther, and Simon Lunn and Nicholas William. 
The topics of burden sharing and burden shifting go back to the earliest days of 
NATO. Thies writes that the issue began after World War II, when countries (many of 
which were early NATO members) began to invest more money in domestic programs 
such as education and healthcare, vice the military.19 The rise of additional cost burdens 
caused the alliance to look into redistributing the financial costs among all members of the 
alliance, which would assist in keeping costs down while still providing collective defense. 
This was important due to fiscal constraints brought on by the rise of welfare programs 
during the latter stages of the Cold War, and even further cuts afterwards, which caused 
 
17 Attila Mesterhazy, “Burden Sharing: New Commitments in a New Era,” NATO Parliamentary 




18 Walter J. Thies, Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO (New York: Routledge, 
2003), 3. 
19 Thies, 3. 
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modern welfare states to be hard pressed to fund their militaries as well as their other social 
projects.20  
The consensus among the authors is in favor of burden sharing. Thies states that 
the goal of burden sharing was an attempt to, “close the gap between demands and 
resources by eliminating duplication and overlap, thereby allowing efficiencies and 
economies of scale that would make possible a robust collective effort at a manageable 
cost.”21 Abenheim and Walther view on burden sharing is that it is, “the tasks of mutual 
aid and self-help for collective defense.”22 Abenheim and Walther note that historically 
any discussions on burden sharing began with a, “fundamental consensus about alliance 
cohesion and the trans-Atlantic security.”23 These feelings are echoed in Richter and 
Webb’s 2012 paper, which uses NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s 
proposal for Smart Defense as a new approach toward burden sharing in an era with 
enhanced fiscal constraints.24 Smart Defense, according to the authors, “seeks to address 
the issue of burden sharing in a climate of economic downturn by encouraging closer 
alignment and even interdependencies of defense spending and acquisition among member 
nations.”25 They continue by claiming that this will help address the issues of “alignment 
of member nations forces, the interoperability of NATO forces, and the notion of burden 
sharing.”26  
While there are a lot of positives to burden sharing, there are negative aspects to it 
due to a perception of inequality among contributors. While the concept of burden sharing 
 
20 Thies, 3. 
21 Thies, 6. 
22 Rachal Epstein, Donald Abenheim, and Marc-Andre Walther, “Burden-Sharing Within NATO: 
Facts from Germany for the Current Debate,” Political Violence at a Glance, August 7, 2018, 1. 
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/60215. 
23 Epstein et al. “Burden-Sharing Within NATO: Facts from Germany for the Current Debate,” 2. 
24 Anke Richter and Natalie J. Webb, “Can Smart Defense Work? A Suggested Approach to Increasing 
Risk- and Burden-Sharing Within NATO,” Naval Postgraduate School, 2012. 
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/37010 
25 Richter and Webb, “Can Smart Defense Work? A Suggested Approach to Increasing Risk- and 
Burden-Sharing Within NATO.” 
26 Richter and Webb, “Can Smart Defense Work?” 
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is noble and in ways beneficial for all in fiscal terms, Lunn and Williams note that the 
alliance has never been able to agree on, “a definition of what constitutes a national ‘fair’ 
share by identifying specific national factors—economic, historic, other non-NATO 
contributions to stability—which could influence NATO members’ ability to contribute to 
the narrowly defined NATO target.”27 They argue that too often the measure of burden 
sharing has strictly been tied to what each nation contributes financially to NATO instead 
of taking into account the full means that nations contribute.28 They note that anything 
involved with spending should be aimed at identifying what the alliance needs in order to 
have an effective collective defense and note that blindly throwing money at the problem 
would result in capability shortfalls due to the money not being spent where it is needed.29 
Richter and Webb discuss the role of burden sharing and its impact on the smaller member 
states within NATO. They state that these members could be hesitant to contribute their 
fair share due to their reservations in spending large amounts of money, when the larger 
states are more financially equipped to carry the burden (leading to burden shifting).30 
A good example of the burden-sharing dilemma is given by Abenheim and Walther, 
who compare how Germany and France contribute to the alliance. Germany, which is 
working to increase its military spending, has historically been one of the most dependable 
members in fulfilling the country’s burden-sharing role. While the authors point out that 
the German military has been financially neglected by the German government since the 
end of the Cold War, Germany has continued to meet all obligations while taking on new 
roles such as training and maintaining NATO’s first Very High Readiness Joint Task 
Force.31 On the flip side of the coin is France, which has a higher defense budget but 
contributes less to NATO.32 The authors give the example of the French Force de Frappe, 
 
27 Simon Lunn and Nicholas Williams., “NATO Defence Spending: The Irrationality of 2%,” 
European Leadership Network, June 2017, 3. 
28 Lunn and Williams, 4. 
29 Lunn and Williams, 4. 
30 Richter and Webb, “Can Smart Defense Work? A Suggested Approach to Increasing Risk- and 
Burden-Sharing Within NATO.” 
31 Epstein et al. “Burden-Sharing Within NATO: Facts from Germany for the Current Debate,” 2-3. 
32 Epstein et al., 3. 
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and state that it is “a purely national asset that will never be included into NATO’s strategic 
assets.”33 In addition, France’s contribution to NATO’s Standing Maritime Group has been 
largely inconsistent.34 These two cases give an example of a country that is serious in its 
contribution to the burden sharing role, while the other’s actions fall more in line with 
conducting burden shifting. 
The topic of burden shifting and its benefits are heavily discussed in Thies’ piece. 
He observes that the financial concerns brought on by the rise of the welfare state has led 
to heavy burden shifting among the alliance as members look to their fellow members to 
raise or at least maintain their defense budgets so others could reallocate funds in order to 
pay for other programs.35 Thies writes that burden shifting is appealing to the alliance 
members due to the integration that occurs within the NATO construct. He notes that, 
“integration increased the extent to which the forces of one NATO member could substitute 
for those of the others. The greater the degree of substitutability, the greater the temptation 
to engage in burden shifting.”36 When discussing burden sharing versus burden shifting, 
Lunn and Williams note the recent trend of European members that are increasing their 
military funding, thus giving more for burden sharing. This has in turn allowed for the 
United States to shift toward burden shifting by asking the European members to continue 
their spending increases so the United States will not have to contribute as much to the 
alliance.37 
The main issue with burden shifting is the underlying political issues that it can 
cause. As Lunn and Williams note, most members of the alliance build their militaries in a 
manner that fits into the larger NATO construct as part of the collective defense.38 Such 
countries are more willing to shift the burden to the larger members, whose militaries are 
built to deal with global issues beyond the NATO mission. If a country is continuously 
 
33 Epstein et al., 3. 
34 Epstein et al., 3. 
35 Thies, Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO, 4. 
36 Thies, 14. 
37 Lunn and Williams, “NATO Defence Spending: The Irrationality of 2%,” 8. 
38 Lunn and Williams, 4. 
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seen to be shirking its responsibilities with the expectation of someone else picking up the 
slack, the result could undermine the political cohesion within the alliance. When 
discussing the situation of members not fulfilling their contribution role, Thies notes that 
it could, “sow discord throughout the alliance, thereby spreading doubts about its value.”39  
Abenheim and Walter write about the consequences of the alliance fracturing, stating that 
Europe would fall back into its old rivalries, which could cause a security crisis that would 
threaten not only Europe, but the United States as well.40 
Each of the writings used in this literature review agree that the issues of burden 
sharing and burden shifting goes back to the earliest days of the alliance and will continue 
to be topic within the alliance going forward. As noted above, burden sharing is valuable 
as it helps maintain the alliance through the formation of a strong joint force, allowing for 
a collective defense without each individual member having to form a single large force on 
their own. Burden shifting, while useful in allowing members of the alliance the ability to 
shift responsibilities around, can carry major political risks. These risks could cause rifts 
among the alliance that could be used to undermine its cohesion, causing potentially further 
harm. 
In terms of how burden sharing played into OUP, there were reservations whether 
the European members would be able to truly take the operational lead prior to the 
operation commencing. During discussion within the Obama Administration regarding 
whether the United States should participate in an intervention, Barack Obama observed, 
“despite the rhetoric from Sarkozy (France’s president) and Cameron (the United 
Kingdom’s prime minister), the U.S. military would end up having to carry most of the 
load for any operation in Libya.”41 In order to prevent this from occurring, Obama decided 
to use burden sharing to his advantage by having U.S. assets conduct the earliest missions 
into Libya and to utilize the U.S.’ unique capabilities to defeat Libyan air defenses which 
allowed the European nations air superiority and the eventual handoff of operational 
 
39 Thies, Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO, 14. 
40 Epstein et all. “Burden-Sharing Within NATO: Facts from Germany for the Current Debate,” 4. 
41 Barack Obama, “On the High Wire,” in A Promised Land, (New York: Crown, 2020), 657. 
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control to the European members.42 While this maneuver by Obama was a perfect example 
of burden sharing at work, other developments during the course of OUP showed the 
limitations of burden sharing due to the lack of funding European countries had given their 
respective militaries, resulting in shortages of weapons and logistics.43 
C. REASONING FOR OPERATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR 
In the leadup to Operation Unified Protector, the one unifying theme across the 
NATO alliance was to prevent reprisals against Libyan civilians by the Qaddafi regime.44 
Further reasoning for intervening in Libya was dependent on the respective countries that 
ultimately participated in the operation. In terms of NATO holistically, the desire to act 
stemmed from the inaction of the alliance to intervene in affairs on the African continent 
during the 1990s. The genocide that occurred in Rwanda in 1994 occurred during a time 
when NATO was largely unemployed due to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The 
failure by the international community to intervene left a lasting impression on the alliance, 
causing it to get involved in similar genocides that would later occur in Bosnia and Kosovo. 
These conflicts took place in NATO’s realm of Europe, allowing the alliance more 
flexibility in getting involved. These conflicts paved the way for NATO’s eventual 
involvement in the War on Terrorism, marking the first occasion that NATO operated 
outside of Europe.45  
In terms of why certain members of NATO decided to intervene in Libya, it is 
important to look at what has occurred in the years since the end of OUP. The mass 
migration that has occurred throughout Europe and the Mediterranean basin in the wake of 
the turmoil in Syria and throughout Africa could be a fear that had been realized. When the 
revolution began in Libya on February 16, 2011, Qaddafi’s forces responded by killing two 
 
42 Obama, “on the High Wire,” 569. 
43 Allin and Jones, “As Good as it Gets?” Survival, 53, no. 3 (June-July 2011): 209, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2011.586219 
44 Gareth Chappell, “Operation Unified Protector: No ‘Swan Song’ for NATO,” The Polish Quarterly 
of International Affairs no. 2 (2011): 65. 
45 James Sperling and Mark Webber, “NATO: From Kosovo to Kabul,” International Affairs no 3. 
(2009), 501. 
10 
hundred thirty people on February 21, showcasing to the world the ruthlessness of the 
Libyan regime.46 With Libya in turmoil, the fear of a mass exodus across the 
Mediterranean and into the Southern European countries may have been a concern. The 
concern over an immigration crisis is supported by the fact that the countries in Southern 
Europe (France, Spain, Italy, and Greece) that would be subjected to a mass migration from 
Libya, all participated in OUP in some form.47 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis will use three components to help in determining why NATO came to a 
consensus on the decision to participate in a conflict in Libya: 
1. The thesis will evaluate the domestic political landscape that France, the 
United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany were facing in the 
timeframe leading up to OUP to determine how their political landscapes 
impacted their actions.  
2. It will examine NATO’s political reasoning (outside of the individual 
member’s reasoning) for wanting to participate in an intervention against 
Libya. Topics will include the desire to stop the fragmentation of NATO 
prior to Libya, background information regarding NATO’s assumption of 
the command-and-control lead, and identification of the pros and cons 
given by scholars regarding the alliance’s decision to intervene in Libya.  
3. It will discuss how burden sharing affected the operations and will discuss 
how the lessons learned from the operation can be applied in order for a 
new transatlantic security relationship to be formed with the European 
members at the helm. 
 
46 Richard A.C. Alton and Jason Reed Struble, “The Constitutionality and Advancement of 
International Humanitarian Ideals in Libya by NATO and United States’ Operations Odyssey Dawn and 
Unified Protector,” Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 23, no.1 (Winter 2014): 7. 
47 David Yost, NATO, the UN, & Other International Organizations in Libya, 26. 
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E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is composed of three additional chapters. Chapter II will provide a 
background to the conflict and will discuss the various political reasons that the major 
NATO players (France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany) had 
regarding their role in the operation and discuss the political maneuvering that occurred 
domestically among these members and how politics drove their actions regarding their 
respective contributions.  
Chapter III will include an examination of NATO’s desire to stop the fragmentation 
of the alliance’s members that was occurring in the leadup to Libya and the humanitarian 
reasons for getting involved in a conflict in Libya. The chapter will discuss the Kosovo 
Campaign of 1999, which was conducted along similar humanitarian lines to Operation 
Unified Protector and was mostly conducted through the use of combat aircraft. Finally, 
Chapter III will review the pros and cons of NATO’s involvement in Libya.  
Chapter IV will offer lessons learned from the campaign and the lasting impact that 
NATO’s involvement has had on the alliance and the world immediately following the 
campaign. This chapter will be the final chapter of this thesis, offering final thoughts on 
NATO’s involvement in Operation Unified Protector and will provide recommendations 
on how the alliance can operate in future operations where the European members may 
have to take the operational lead in a coordinated effort against an adversary. 
12 
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II. THE ROAD FROM ARAB SPRING TO OPERATION UNIFIED 
PROTECTOR 
The events that transpired in Northern Africa in the early months of 2011 
precipitated a major change in world affairs. The Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt ignited 
insurrection in neighboring Libya, where Muammar al-Qaddafi had ruled with an iron fist 
since 1969.48 The resulting revolution brought the downfall of the Qaddafi regime partly 
due to the intervention of NATO forces, whose members had dealt with Qaddafi’s 
transgressions throughout his time as the leader of Libya.49  NATO’s decision to act 
against was difficult for many of the member states. France, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and Germany faced a variety of political arguments as they decided whether 
they would participate in an intervention in Libya. Ultimately, United Nations Security 
Resolution 1973 allowed for the establishment and enforcement of a no-fly zone and the 
use of all means necessary to protect civilians from attacks by Qaddafi’s forces.50 Even so, 
not every NATO member joined this mission – for reasons that were important then and 
remain important today. This chapter will discuss the road to intervention from the 
beginning of the Arab Spring, through the political maneuvering of the key four NATO 
players, to the ultimate assumption of operations by NATO in March 2011. 
A. LIBYA’S COMPLICATED ROLE IN THE WORLD 
Muammar al-Qaddafi was a unique world leader with a complicated relationship 
with Western nations. During the 1980s, Qaddafi’s regime was linked to international 
terrorism, which earned him the titles of “the mad dog of the Middle East” from President 
Ronald Reagan and “the crazy Libyan” from Egypt’s President Anwar el-Sadat.51 His role 
in financing and arming extremist elements assisted in devastating terrorist attacks in 
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Europe, including the bombing of a West Berlin nightclub on April 5, 1986 (killing two 
U.S. servicemen and injuring 200) and the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, 
Scotland on December 20, 1988 (killing 270 people).52 These actions led to confrontations 
with the United States throughout the 1980s, including Operation El Dorado Canyon in 
1986, which was a direct response by the United States to the West Berlin nightclub 
bombing that had killed three people (including one U.S. serviceman) and injured 229 
people.53 Throughout the 1980s, the United States and Libya had several incidents in the 
Gulf of Sidra (in 1981, 1986, and 1989), resulting in military fires being exchanged 
between the two countries.54  However, the 1990s saw a change in Libya and in Qaddafi, 
who suddenly undertook actions to rebuild his reputation with the West.55  
This process began in the early 1990s with the regime’s suspension of non-
conventional weapons programs in the wake of the U.S. led invasion of Iraq in 1991 and 
continued later in the decade with the handing over of two individuals that were believed 
to be involved in the Pan Am 103 bombing.56 The biggest change from Libya came after 
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda against the United States. Qaddafi 
not only condemned the attacks but also cooperated with the United States by offering 
intelligence on Al-Qaeda.57 These actions helped persuade the United States and Great 
Britain to re-establish diplomatic relationships with Libya. The re-establishment of 
diplomatic ties allowed Libya to have a larger role in the world, to include being invited to 
international conferences and the re-establishment of additional diplomatic ties.58 
However, the geopolitical situation in Libya and its neighboring countries was becoming 
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untenable for their respective populations. In Libya, the general public’s long simmering 
feelings of hatred toward Qaddafi would be ignited by the Arab Spring, ultimately leading 
to the downfall of the Qaddafi regime.59 
B. THE ARAB SPRING AND THE BEGINNING OF A REVOLUTION IN 
LIBYA 
The story of the Libyan civil war began with the Arab Spring, which, in its turn, 
started on December 17, 2010, when a 26-year-old Tunisian man burned himself alive after 
a perceived insult at the hands of a police officer in Sidi Bouzid.60 Others, who 
sympathized with the young man’s situation, immediately began to protest against the 
Tunisian government. Within days the protests spread throughout Tunisia; demonstrators 
implored President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to resign immediately. A month later, the 
president removed himself from power and left the country.61 The uprising in Tunisia set 
in motion similar protests in Egypt, starting on January 25, 2011 and ultimately resulting 
in President Hosni Mubarak stepping down on February 11th.62 These events provided the 
roots for an uprising to begin in the country that is located between Tunisia and Egypt, 
Libya. 
The movement reached Libya on February 15, when protests began in Benghazi. 
The demonstrators prompted additional revolutionary uprisings throughout Libya, 
resulting in regime sympathizers being driven into hiding throughout the country.63 Unlike 
the protests in the other two countries, the Libyan protestors were unable to hold onto their 
momentum; they were ultimately met with extremely harsh reprisals from forces loyal to 
Qaddafi.64 These troops responded through various means including dropping bombs on 
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protestors from military aircraft, resulting in the deaths of over 300 civilians.65 As 
Qaddafi’s forces moved in on the Benghazi area, the regime threatened that they would go 
house-to-house in search of protestors.66 On February 22, Qaddafi addressed the country, 
assuring the population that he would remain in power and that he would hunt down rebels 
“like rats.”67 The threatening nature of Qaddafi’s speech, along with what was occurring 
within the country, caught the attention of the international community; many states 
recalled their representatives and citizens from Libya.68 
Additional criticism and calls for Qaddafi to step down came from U.S. President 
Barack Obama, who criticized Qaddafi’s actions against his populace, saying, “The United 
States strongly supports the universal rights of the Libyan people…like all governments, 
the Libyan government has a responsibility to refrain from violence, to allow humanitarian 
assistance to reach those in need, and to respect the rights of its people. It must be held 
accountable for its failure to meet these responsibilities, and face the cost of continued 
violations of human rights.”69  
Within a month of the protests beginning in Libya, the UN began to work toward a 
resolution to protect Libyan civilians from the atrocities being directed at them by the 
Libyan government. The UN’s initial move, detailed in UNSCR 1970, called on all 
member states to impose an arms embargo against Libya, implementing a travel ban on 
officials from the Libyan regime, and freeze the Libyan regimes financial assets.70 As the 
UN worked to enact UNSCR 1970, members of the international community began to 
discuss how and when an intervention in Libya might occur. 
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C. VARYING REASONS FOR AN INTERVENTION  
The discussions among European powers and the United States regarding 
intervening in Libya began to heat up in late February into March. During this time, 6,000 
Libyan civilians were killed during Qaddafi’s crackdown on the populace.71 France and 
the United Kingdom were among the most ardent supporters of a military intervention in 
Libya, with France speaking out the loudest and earliest.72 In the early stages, two distinct 
camps emerged regarding whether to intervene or not. France and Britain emerged as 
proponents of an intervention, while the United States (initially) and Germany were against 
intervening in Libya. The reasoning for each country’s answer to the question varied but 
followed similar lines. 
1. France and Britain: Proponents for an Intervention 
As noted above, both the French and British supported a military intervention in 
Libya due to their concern of Qaddafi’s threat to massacre the dissidents. The common 
theme between the two included a desire to avoid a repeat of the Srebrenica massacre of 
1995, especially in a country located close to Europe.73 This shared concern added to the 
individual concerns that each country experienced in early 2011, which ranged from 
support of the domestic populace to having an operation occur in an election year. 
a. France: Setting the Stage for a European Response 
The French wanted to commit forces in Libya extremely early into the insurrection 
in Libya. However, feelings differed within the French government regarding the situation. 
Even though French President Nicolas Sarkozy was a fervent supporter of an intervention, 
the French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe disagreed, stating, “France, for its part, does not 
think that in the current circumstances military intervention, NATO forces, would be 
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welcomed in the south of the Mediterranean and could be counterproductive.”74 While 
these two members of the French government differed on France’s course of action, the 
desires of the French president ultimately won the day. Sarkozy found the situation in Libya 
as a means to a political end, especially with an opportunity to show strength with an 
election on the horizon.75 By getting involved in Libya, Sarkozy hoped to show that 
Europeans could interject themselves into a crisis, take the lead, and deal with it 
appropriately – without the United State in a leading role (and by proxy NATO due to the 
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) always being a U.S. flag officer).76 In 
addition, Sarkozy wanted to help fix France’s image, which had been tarnished by its 
response to the Arab Spring uprisings in Tunisia. By intervening in Libya, Sarkozy hoped 
to show the Arab Spring was aligned with France’s values of liberty and human rights.77  
One of the key factors that drove the French was a massacre that occurred in 1995 
at Srebrenica, in the former Yugoslavia. The massacre involved the Bosnian Muslim 
community, which saw 8,000 people killed by Bosnian military forces and an additional 
23,000 Muslims deported.78 The legacy of Srebrenica is a tragedy where a European force 
under the auspices of the United Nations was unable to hold off an overwhelming 
adversary, resulting in the systematic execution and deportation of thousands of innocent 
civilians. This event had a lasting effect on the psyche of the French, with Grand noting, 
“digging deeper into France’s motivations, the memories of Srebrenica and other atrocities 
committed during the Balkan wars played an important role.”79 The French government 
and the domestic population (especially among Libyan exiles) agreed that the country 
should act to avoid another massacre, providing legitimate reasoning for the French to 
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become involved in Libya.80 However, President Sarkozy had additional reasons for 
wanting to involve France in the conflict. According to the United Kingdom’s House of 
Commons Foreign Affairs Committee’s report “Libya: Examination of Intervention and 
Collapse and the UK’s Future Policy Options,” Sarkozy had the following reasons for 
involvement:  
A desire to gain a greater share of Libya oil production, increase French 
influence in North Africa, improve his internal political situation in France, 
provide the French military with an opportunity to reassert its position in 
the world, and address the concern of his advisors over Qaddafi’s long-term 
plans to supplant France as the dominant power in Francophone Africa.81 
Armed with his reasoning for intervention and backed by initial domestic public 
approval (approximately 66 percent favored an intervention), Sarkozy moved forward with 
his desires for committing France’s military forces.82 To bolster his stance, Sarkozy 
worked to leverage the support of the United Kingdom, which had also called for an 
intervention and with whom France had recently signed a defense treaty in November 
2010.83  
b. The United Kingdom: An Urge to do Something 
To the British, on the one hand, Libya presented itself as a conflict that was outside 
of the parameters laid out in its National Security Strategy (NSS). Michael Clarke writes 
that “of the fifteen generic ‘priority risks’ the NSS sets out as a basis for strategic action to 
defend and promote British interests, the Libya scenario could just about be covered by 
half of one of the generic cases, and one that was put firmly in the midst of  the second of 
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three tiers of priority risks to be addressed.”84 In short, Libya was not a situation in which 
the government would normally want to involve itself. In the weeks leading up to the 
intervention, some military planning had begun but many within the British government 
and military leaders believed that the United Kingdom would not participate in a Libya 
operation; indeed, Prime Minister David Cameron had previously stated his opposition to 
any sort of “liberal interventionalism” that had occurred during his predecessor’s (Tony 
Blair) time in office.85 
In the end, however, Prime Minister Cameron pushed his support for an 
intervention down onto parliament (instead of a vote of support coming up through 
Parliament), which was well outside of normal operating procedure.86 His decision came 
due to the rapidly changing situation in Libya and his belief that something had to be 
done.87 In addition, Cameron, like his French counterpart, found himself recalling the 
horrors of Srebrenica and wanted to avoid a similar occurrence from happening again, 
privately mentioning that he did not want Benghazi to become another Srebrenica88 
Cameron’s minister of defence, Liam Fox, warned the prime minister that the 
country was already heavily invested in operations in Afghanistan and that any operation 
in Libya would be at great expense to the British military for very little in return.89 While 
Cameron agreed with Fox regarding the need to keep Afghanistan as the main-focus, he 
ordered the military to begin formulating plans for initial operations in Libya to include a 
naval blockade and no-fly zone.90 
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Cameron shared Sarkozy’s vision that an intervention was a way to showcase 
European strength within the region at a time when the United States was hesitant to 
involve itself in another conflict outside of the operations it was already committed to.91 
2. The United States and Germany: Weary of Involvement 
The United States and Germany found themselves as bedfellows regarding their 
initial reluctance regarding an intervention in Libya. Both nations were already heavily 
involved with operations in the Middle East, with the United States involved in conflicts 
in Afghanistan, Iraq, and off the coast of Somalia. The Germans were also involved in 
operations in Afghanistan, operations that were extremely controversial among the German 
public.92 While the two countries shared a common concern for additional embroilment of 
its forces, the United States eventually diverged from its German partners to support an 
operation in Libya while the Germans remained against an intervention. 
a. The United States: Sitting on the Fence 
In early 2011, many within the Obama administration were strongly against the 
United States getting involved in another conflict with resources already stretched thin, 
especially another conflict in a Muslim country. That is, the United States was already 
dealing with conflicts in two Muslim countries, and it had an ongoing dispute with a third 
Muslim country (Iran).93 As noted by Ramoin, “like most Western powers, the United 
States has been caught on the wrong side of history on more than one occasion. The history 
of U.S. foreign policy in the Arab world has been plagued with ulterior motives and 
diplomatic hypocrisy.”94 The situation in Libya, was quickly evolving from a humanitarian 
crisis into a full-blown civil war.95 In addition, the United States (like most of the world) 
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was still recovering from the recession of 2008, which had caused serious ramifications to 
the nation’s budget.96 While the president was unsure of how to proceed, he had laid 
groundwork for an intervention during his acceptance speech for the Nobel Prize that he 
won in 2009: 
More and more, we all confront difficult questions about how to prevent the 
slaughter of civilians by their own government, or to stop a civil war whose 
violence and suffering can engulf an entire region. I believe that force can 
be justified on humanitarian grounds, as it was in the Balkans, or in other 
places that have been scarred by war. Inaction tears at our conscience and 
can lead to more costly intervention later. That’s why all responsible nations 
must embrace the role that militaries with a clear mandate can play to keep 
the peace.97 
These comments seemed almost prepared specifically for the Libya situation, 
although these events were a little over a year away.  
Despite its initial hesitancy, The United States eventually decided to respond to the 
Libya situation with force. Several high-ranking officials adamantly opposed any action, 
including then-Vice President Joe Biden, National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, and 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who stated, “Can I finish the two wars I’m already in 
before you guys go looking for a third one?”98 Gates stated that Qaddafi, “was not a threat 
to us anywhere. He was a threat to his own people, and that was about it.”99 With the 
administration divided on its opinion of what to do, President Obama dispatched then-
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to meet with a member of the rebellion, Mahmoud 
Jibril.100 Jibril, who attended college in the United States, convinced Clinton of the 
opposition’s ability to lead Libya if Qaddafi was removed from power. The Secretary 
relayed her information to the president, which influenced his final decision (which 
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President Obama noted as being a personal 51–49 percent decision in favor of 
involvement).101 
The next issue the United States needed to address was what kind of operation 
would occur and what the U.S. role would be. According to former U.S. Ambassador to 
NATO Ivo Daadler, 
Cameron and Sarkozy were the undisputed leaders, in terms of doing 
something. The problem was that it was not clear what that something was 
going to be. Cameron was pushing for a no-fly zone, but in the United States 
there was great skepticism. A no-fly zone was not effective in Bosnia, it was 
not effective in Iraq, and would probably not be effective in Libya. When 
President Obama was confronted with the argument for a no-fly zone, he 
asked how this was going to be effective. Qaddafi was attacking people. A 
no-fly zone was not going to stop him. Instead, to stop him we would need 
to bomb his forces attacking people.102 
While the exact nature of the operation remained uncertain, the president expressed 
his desire to have the U.S. role reduced as soon as possible, with someone else taking over 
the major command and control role.103  
b. Germany: Hesitant to Embroil Itself in Further Conflict 
The Germans, as previously noted, had been hesitant to get involved in another 
conflict due to the increasingly negative view of its role in Afghanistan. Extreme domestic 
negativity to foreign operations by the Bundeswehr began to escalate after the 2009 Kunduz 
airstrike incident in Afghanistan, when a German Colonel ordered an airstrike on a Taliban 
target that resulted in the deaths of over 100 innocent civilians.104 The negativity toward 
the deployment of German forces intensified due to another incident in 2010 where German 
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forces killed six Afghani troops in a friendly fire incident.105 These accidents highlighted 
the shift the Bundeswehr had experienced while in Afghanistan, a transition from what 
Sascha Bleibohm calls “aid workers in uniform,” to a military force at war.106 Bleibohm 
notes, “the Afghanistan conflict, however, showed that debates in society and in the 
Bundestag on the use of violence and deployments abroad changed significantly, and 
hence, the German people critically questioned the foreign policy of projecting national 
interests with military means.”107 
The quick reversal by the United States gave no time for the Germans to change 
their mind due to the political maneuvering and discussion required within the Bundestag 
(German parliament).108 The German government had already convened to discuss the 
Libya question, making decisions against military participation and against political 
authorization.109 Brockmeier writes, “The first decision was largely made before the 
government had considered how to vote on a UN resolution. Indeed, such a position is 
consistent with the traditional German reluctance to consider the use of military force 
abroad, which has been reinforced by entrenched public dissatisfaction with the war in 
Afghanistan.”110 However, these decisions could have been revisited if the United States 
notified the Germans earlier that it had a change of strategy in its attitude toward Libya. If 
more notice were given, the Bundestag could have reconvened and allowed for more 
discussion on the topic, possibly leading to the Germans changing their position on the 
Security Council vote, and possibly even agreeing to allow its military to participate in 
operations against Libya. Ultimately, the Germans decided to abstain from voting during 
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the Security Council meeting, which caused consternation among its allies within 
NATO.111 
In addition to not wanting to commit forces to another conflict, the Germans were 
hesitant to have their forces get involved in a situation where they may be placed in harm’s 
way and where civilian casualties were seen as an inevitability.112 In addition, the German 
government was concerned with the question of what the political ramifications be in Libya 
once the conflict ended.113  
D. THE MOVE TOWARD UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 
RESOLUTION 1973 
As the major players of France, Great Britain, the United States, and Germany 
worked through their internal machinations toward their options regarding Libya, ministers 
representing the various NATO members met in Brussels for a previously scheduled 
meeting. Chivvis writes that during this meeting, “NATO had begun so-called ‘prudent 
planning’ – a form of contingency planning conducted at the discretion of the Supreme 
Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR).”114 This step provided information for the 
alliance, while maintaining the stance that there were no immediate plans for NATO to get 
involved. It was during this meeting of ministers that the initial seeds for Operation Unified 
Protector were planted. However, the journey to come to a decision for NATO to act was 
far from over, with the decision moving to a G8 conference that was planned for March 
14th.115 
The lack of consensus among the alliance members was showcased during the 
meeting of ministers. The disagreement among the members started with the hottest topic, 
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which was the option to impose a no-fly zone over Libya. The French, who were ardent 
supporters of no-fly zone, wanted to impose it outside of NATO’s control and use a 
coalition of the willing instead (even though the French had recently rejoined the integrated 
military structure of the alliance) due to its desire to circumvent the United States from 
getting involved.116 The coalition of willing would act in a manner similar to the coalition 
of nations aligned with the United States’ anti-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.117 
France’s reasoning for having a coalition of the willing stemmed from their desire to reduce 
the influence of other members of the alliance that were not in favor of a NATO 
intervention, specifically the influence of Turkey.118 The French ultimately realized that a 
no-fly zone would not be enough to stop the Qaddafi regime’s forces on the ground, which 
would mean that targeted strikes against Qaddafi’s forces would be required.119 While the 
British were aboard with the implementation of a no-fly zone, the United States and 
Germany were against implementing one.120 U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 
while testifying in front of Congress, observed that offensive strikes by the United States 
against Libyan air defense systems could be seen as another attack by the United States 
against a Muslim country.121 While the British supported a no-fly zone, they were not in 
favor of the coalition of the willing that France had mentioned, instead arguing that NATO 
would be the best option for taking the lead in an operation.122  
At the G8 meeting of foreign ministers in Paris convened, the debate over the no-
fly zone continued. At this point, the French and British were attempting to obtain an 
agreement on implementing a no-fly zone, while the United States and Germany were still 
aligned on their decision against any action against Libya (as President Obama had not yet 
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changed his mind).123 Brockmeier notes that there was some disagreement between the 
United States and Germany at this point, centered on the fact that the United States had 
begun to develop military options while the Germans had not (the Germans had only asked 
the internal question of whether they had the necessary resources to participate in a no-fly 
zone, which they did).124 The disagreement became a moot point on March 15th, when the 
decision reversal from the Obama Administration was announced, which included support 
for a no-fly zone and the use of targeted strikes against Libyan forces.125 These options 
gave the United States the ability to protect civilians in Libya in case the Qaddafi regime 
attempted any hostilities against Benghazi. Of note, the updated resolution included 
language that prevented the use of ground forces as an occupying force.126 
The movement toward a no-fly zone quickly picked up steam, with draft legislation 
for a no-fly zone already prepared. With input from the Lebanese, French, British, and 
Americans, the final draft was presented with language included to use all necessary force 
in order to protect civilians from Libyan attacks. The change in attitude by the United 
States, as previously noted, caught the Germans completely off guard. Vice Chancellor 
Guido Westerwelle discovered the news right after he had given a speech to the Bundestag 
denouncing any sort of military action against Libya.127 Brockmeier observes that the 
strong language used in his speech to the Bundestag essentially gave him no option to 
attempt to change course and that a proper notification by the United States. could have 
given him time to attempt some political massaging within the Bundestag for possible 
German participation.128 According to Brockmeier, “it is equally significant that earlier 
notification of the American change of heart would have created an opportunity for an 
informed discussion of the matter among members of parliament.”129 In fact, it would only 
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be 34 hours from the time the Germans were informed of the U.S. switch until the vote in 
the UN would occur. The final vote for UNSCR 1973 occurred on March 17th, with ten 
members of the Security Council passing the resolution, with the remaining five members 
(Brazil, Germany, India, and Russia) abstaining.130 
The German’s decision to abstain from UNSCR 1973 caused unexpected blowback 
between Germany and the United States. While the Germans had been put into a tough 
situation due to the last-minute U.S. change of mind, their ensuing decision to abstain was 
seen as a slap in the face to the other members of the alliance. Chivvis writes that the vote, 
“created one of the most serious rifts in United States-German relations since the 2003 Iraq 
War. It was a clear break with Germany’s closest European and American allies, and to 
make matters worse, it appeared to put Germany on the Russian side against them.”131 
While the perception of the German vote was wildly unpopular at the time, the German 
domestic political process behind it was not well understood by the other NATO partners. 
Importantly, the Germans did not attempt to block a NATO action or remove their forces 
from NATO headquarters during the conflict. As the conflict went on, the Germans 
ultimately chose to increase their financial and diplomatic support of the mission while 
also providing German military personnel at NATO headquarters to participate in the 
planning of the operation.132 
E. THE BEGINNING OF OPERATIONS AND THE SHIFT TO NATO 
CONTROL 
With UNSCR 1973 passed, the United States, France, Great Britain, and Canada 
quickly moved to launch their own respective operations against Libyan forces. These 
operations were: Operation Odyssey Dawn (United States), Operation Harmattan (France), 
Operation ELLAMY (Great Britain), and Operation MOBILE (Canada).133 These various 
operations were conducted and commanded by their respective countries, but were 
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coordinated by the United States.134 The French were the first members of the coalition to 
begin operations, launching two aircraft to strike Qaddafi’s forces near Benghazi.135 The 
United States and United Kingdom began operations soon thereafter by launching 
Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles from naval vessels in the Mediterranean against 
Libyan air defense forces.136 As noted by the then SACEUR and Commander of U.S. 
European Command (EUCOM) James Stavridis, the initial strikes, “reduced the capability 
of Libya’s air defense systems within the first seventy-two hours.”137 These strikes 
severely degraded the Libyan integrated air defenses, which allowed coalition aircraft to 
enter Libyan air space, achieve air superiority, and establish the no-fly zone.138  
As the four separate operations took place, the preparations for NATO to assume 
operational control of the action, bringing everyone under a single command and control 
structure. The decision to have NATO assume this role had been championed by the United 
States shortly after UNSCR 1973 had passed.139  The reasoning behind this was the belief 
that only NATO had the established command and control to support such a large 
operation, and had credibility with the Arab League states that were also participating in 
the operations against Libya.140 This decision was widely supported by the other members 
of the operation, with France continuing to be the lone dissenter with their idea for a 
coalition of the willing.141 After several days of political maneuvering between the 
American, British, and French diplomats at NATO HQ in Brussels, the decision was 
reached for NATO to assume operational control upon the U.S. drawdown of forces.142 
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The transition of command-and-control functions from the United States ended up 
going relatively smoothly, as Admiral Stavridis was already heavily employed with 
supporting U.S. Africa Command, who had been given the initial role of the in-charge 
combatant command. Stavridis notes that U.S. leadership, “was uncomfortable being the 
face and principal fist behind the operation. Even as NATO took over the continuing 
operations, we sought to give them a broader international flavor.”143 The U.S. decision 
to step back paved the way for other partners from the alliance to take the operational lead 
in the ensuing combat operations while giving NATO the lead in command-and-control 
operations. The allowed NATO to showcase its ability to function in a new conflict near 
its traditional operating area. 
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III. NATO AND OPERATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR 
The political maneuvering between the pro-intervention countries ultimately 
resulted in NATO consolidating the various country-led campaigns into a single NATO-
led operation. While the domestic politics of the respective members varied and continued 
into the assumption of kinetic operations, the consolidation of military and civilian 
representatives under NATO HQ’s roof allowed for enhanced cooperation and 
coordination. The assumption of command by NATO allowed for the alliance to spearhead 
the operation in Libya with UNSCR 1973 acting as its operational guidance. NATO’s 
decision to take on the command and control for Libya operation stemmed from its desire 
to prevent another humanitarian crisis from occurring, while attempting to fix the political 
divide and fracturing of its members in the leadup to Libya. While NATO worked to 
assume command, it looked back to a previous operation that was conducted along similar 
lines. The blueprints it could look back on resided in the plans for NATO’s 1999 Operation 
Allied Force in Kosovo. Operation Allied Force provided a template in how an air war 
could be conducted by the alliance, while preventing the deployment of ground forces into 
the conflict. 
The deployment of NATO air and naval forces against Libya brought up pros and 
cons of NATO’s role in the intervention against Libya. While NATO’s involvement 
assisted in a successful campaign and an opportunity for European military leadership to 
lead the fight, detractors feel NATO overstepped its boundaries and has continued to 
stretch itself thin in a time when it was engaged with other responsibilities in Europe and 
out of area/regions such as Afghanistan. 
A. NATO’S REASONING FOR INVOLVEMENT 
NATO’s decision to get involved in Libya partly stemmed from its perception that 
the alliance was beginning to fracture.144 This concern manifested itself in the years 
preceding the Libyan campaign. A key factor in this stemmed from the heavy cuts in 
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defense spending by most NATO members in the years after the end of the Cold War. 
While many European countries became more affluent after the Iron Curtain fell (gross 
domestic product of European nations grew by 55 percent), their contributions to defense 
spending fell by 20 percent.145 The financial contributions to NATO from the European 
partners were approximately 34% during the Cold War, with the United States and Canada 
footing the rest of the bill.146 By 2009, the contributions by the European members had 
fallen to just 21%.147 This drop in funding occurred over the course of nearly two decades, 
with the bottoming out culminating with the Great Recession of 2008.  
The fracturing that NATO feared became more apparent after the Great Recession. 
In the aftermath, Germany had further cemented itself as a regional economic hegemon, 
with its GDP in 2010 exceeding that of France and the United Kingdom by more than $700 
billion and nearly one trillion dollars.148 While Germany remained in the top spot for 
European countries, the United Kingdom (which had been second prior to the recession) 
swapped spots with France as it struggled to recover from the recession. With Germany’s 
economic prowess relatively intact, it hoped to maintain the status quo with NATO and 
with the United States.149 However, Germany’s desire to maintain the status quo was in 
jeopardy due to the United States’ decision to begin “pivoting” its focus to the Pacific.150 
The intention to reposition military forces away from other areas of concern and to place 
them in the Pacific caused concern among U.S. allies and was exploited by its 
adversaries.151 Regarding the consequences of the pivot to Asia, Ford writes, “American 
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neglect of Europe was followed by Russian adventurism in Ukraine, an increased threat to 
the Baltic states, and the erosion of democracy in Poland and Hungary.”152 
Another area of concern regarding the possible fracturing of the alliance occurred 
in 2010, when the United Kingdom and France agreed to new defense and security 
treaties.153 These treaties occurred concurrently with the United States moving further 
away from Europe and at a time when the two countries needed each other’s assistance 
during the post-recession economic recovery.154 However, instead of using the opportunity 
to reinforce its place in NATO, the French used the treaties as a means to get closer to the 
United Kingdom even though it had reintegrated itself into NATO’s Military Command 
the prior year.155 This became evident during the leadup to OUP when, as previously 
noted, France attempted to form a coalition of the willing. Using this construct would have 
allowed France to utilize its alliance with the United Kingdom as a means to bypass NATO 
(and by proxy involving the United States due to SACEUR being a U.S. flag officer).156 
Even during negotiations, France attempted to have itself placed in charge as the leader of 
the operation, which was strongly rejected by the other members who believed NATO’s 
leadership was critical for success.157  
In light of the growing factions, NATO decided it would be in the alliances best 
interest to assume the command-and-control function, even with the ongoing commitments 
in Afghanistan.158 By doing this, NATO would be able to showcase the alliance’s ability 
to cooperate together and show the alliance’s ability to conduct a large-scale, multi-nation 
operation while operating under the same roof. Even though the operation went ahead 
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without the full participation of all members, Stavridis observed, “the key is not whether 
every ally does everything – the key is that taken together the allied effort provides the 
right combination of resources to accomplish the mission.”159 
B. NATO ASSUMES COMMAND 
On March 27, 2011, NATO assumed operational command of the operation against 
Libya concurrently with the United States’ pulling back from major offensive 
operations.160 The decision by NATO to agree to take over operational control was 
predicated, according to Ramoin, on the conditions of a clear need to intervene, legal 
backing, and support from neighboring countries.161 Each of these caveats were met 
through UNSCR 1973 and the backing of Arab countries throughout the area. NATO was 
able to assume command and develop the operational plans for the operation far more 
quickly than it had done so during previous engagements in Bosnia and Kosovo.162 Part 
of this was the due to the ability of the alliance to utilize plans already implemented by the 
U.S. through European Command and Africa Command, which had led the U.S.’ Operation 
Odyssey Dawn prior to NATO’s assumption of command.163 Regarding NATO’s reason 
for getting involved, Stavridis observes, “only NATO has the standing command structure 
and integrated capabilities necessary to quickly plan and execute such complex 
operations.”164 The launching of Operation Unified Protector marked the first time NATO 
had led a conflict against an Arab country, even though it had participated in other conflicts 
against Arab entities.165 According to Gaub, Operation Unified Protector ultimately, 
“turned out to be one of NATO’s shorter, and seemingly also less controversial, missions” 
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and “a success NATO badly needed after its decade-long engagement in Afghanistan.”166 
In terms of NATO’s mission in Afghanistan, the alliance began operations in Afghanistan 
in 2003 while undertaking the United Nation’s mandate to stop terrorist operations in 
Afghanistan and to prevent future terrorist entities from using the country as a base of 
operations.167 NATO became the leader of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 
whose mission was to assist Afghanistan in becoming a democracy, provide stabilization 
in the area, and to train Afghani troops to be able to conduct security operations throughout 
Afghanistan.168 
Under NATO’s purview, the members of the alliance (and participants outside of 
NATO) came together to launch Operation Unified Protector (OUP). Stavridis notes that 
14 members of NATO provided forces for OUP, with four non-NATO countries providing 
military assets as well.169  According to Stavridis, the following countries provided assets 
to the campaign, including:  
• United States: Intel, aerial refueling, targeting, ordnance, 
• France and the United Kingdom: tactical aircraft (flying over 40% of the sorties 
and destroying more than a third of all targets), 
• Italy: reconnaissance aircraft, 
• Greece and Spain: access to air bases, 
• Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the United Arab Emirates: tactical air 
assets, 
• Jordan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and Qatar: reinforcements to secure 
the no-fly zone.170 
Many of the states listed above, combined with Bulgaria and Qatar, deployed naval 
assets to the Mediterranean to enforce the arms embargo against Libya.171 
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During the operation, NATO’s latitude for operations was restrained by the 
language of UNSCR 1973, which focused on protecting the people of Libya from 
Qaddafi’s harsh reprisals. When discussing UNSCR 1973’s intention, Stavridis observes 
that the alliance, “interpreted to mean we could not directly target Qaddafi or members of 
his regime, put special forces on the ground or bring in the big guns. We were not 
authorized to do everything necessary to ensure regime change because that was not our 
mission.”172 These restrictions harkened back to the Kosovo campaign of 1999, another 
NATO operation that was essentially a large-scale air campaign against an overmatched 
force. 
C. REMEMBERING KOSOVO 
NATO’s involvement in Kosovo in 1999, known as Operation Allied Force, was 
seen as the next test for NATO in the post-Cold War era that had seen to alliance involved 
in other operations in Europe (to include Bosnia).173 NATO intervened in Kosovo because 
it, according to Sperling and Webber, “was compelled to act (and then to see the action 
through), at least in part, out of an appreciation that its credibility was at stake.”174 Many 
of the reasons for getting involved in Kosovo would resurface in the leadup to the 
intervention in Libya, including the ugly memories of Bosnia and Rwanda.175 U.S. 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated, “we would have been judged very harshly if 
we allowed something like to happen again.”176 This view was shared by European 
leaders, who were keen on finding a way to make up for their failures in Bosnia.177 
Ultimately, like in Libya, the alliance initiated an intervention based on humanitarian 
grounds. 
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Operation Allied Force was an operation that included 14 NATO members 
conducting a 78-day air campaign aimed at forcing Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic to 
stop an ethnic cleansing campaign and come to the negotiating table in order to prevent 
further atrocities from occurring, such as the Racak massacre in January 1999.178 The 
Racak massacre was an atrocity where 45 ethnic Albanians were murdered by Yugoslavian 
security forces near the town of Racak in southern Kosovo.179 The massacre, according to 
U.S. diplomat William Walker, was a, “crime against humanity,” and was a catalyst for the 
NATO’s Operation Allied Force.180 The Kosovo campaign offered NATO a chance to 
justify its continued importance in the post-Cold-War world while showing that the 
alliance’s association was balanced among the various members.181 During the air 
campaign, the alliance split up the air sorties among the 14 participants with 60 percent 
being flown by the U.S. forces with the other 13 members allocating, according to Sperling 
and Webber, “about the same share of their available aircraft for prosecuting the campaign 
and virtually all the basing facilities, air traffic coordination, and supporting elements to 
keep the air armada of over 1,000 aircraft functioning throughout the conflict.”182 While 
a ground campaign had been essentially completely ruled out by U.S. and European 
leaders, NATO’s extraction force was comprised solely of European soldiers.183 While 
Operation Allied Force is a template for what the NATO partner’s wanted for OUP, the 
alliance wanted to the avoid the deployment of ground troops as experienced in the latter 
stages of Allied Force. 
During Operation Allied Force, the inter-workings among the allies became 
difficult at times, especially during the target list development stages.184 As noted by 
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General Wesley Clark (SACEUR during Operation Allied Force), “some countries wanted 
to add new targets and strike harder at the Serb ground forces. Other countries wanted to 
find reasons to announce a bombing pause for Easter. No consensus had emerged on the 
ultimate objective of NATO’s efforts or the extent of our resolve to prevail.”185 Along 
similar lines arose due the various nations’ governments being able to individually review 
target lists prior to them being executed.186 Clark notes that of this confusion regarding 
targeting was against the original plan, writing,  
The original plans had presumed that SACEUR would have the authority to 
strike targets within overall categories specified by NATO political leaders, 
but Washington had introduced a target-by-target approval requirement. 
The other Allies began to be increasingly demanding, too. It was British law 
that targets struck by any aircraft based in the United Kingdom had to be 
approved by their lawyers, the French demanded greater insight into the 
targeting and strikes, and of course there had to be continuing consultation 
with NATO headquarters.187 
The disconnect between the various nations on how to best conduct the air 
campaign dragged on well into the conflict, causing consternation with the NATO military 
leadership. However, as noted by Sperling and Webber, an alliance of 19 (at the time) 
nations were going to have serious disagreements on the use of military force.188 Yet, the 
alliance appeared to be closer than it appeared due to the alliance remaining united (even 
if some members were against the operations) throughout the duration of the campaign.189  
Kosovo was an important campaign for NATO to learn from, especially when 
looking into the lessons learned and how they could be applied in the Libya campaign. 
Operation Allied Force showed how NATO could be successful in a humanitarian crisis. 
As noted by then U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen, “had NATO not responded to 
Milosevic’s…campaign of ethnic cleansing, its credibility would have been called into 
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question.”190 One of the key lessons learned in the air campaign was that no individual 
member of NATO could conduct such a large operation alone.191 This gave additional 
credence to the often maligned effort of burden sharing, showing that the various air forces 
of NATO could come together to make one cohesive force capable of conducting a large 
air campaign. In the absence of a ground war, the implementation of strategic air strikes 
against Yugoslavian infrastructure (especially the strikes on critical industrial and 
economic centers) eventually forced Milosevic to enter peace negotiations.192 However, 
Lambeth argues that the air campaign was not the full reason for Milosevic’s change of 
heart, writing that,  
It had become clear that NATO had increasingly accepted the need to go 
ahead with a ground invasion in the event that its air effort alone failed to 
bring about a decisive outcome. Although senior officials in Washington 
remained highly resistant to proceeding with that course right up the very 
end, Milosevic cannot have failed to apprehend the implications of such a 
possibility. 
In the end, Operation Allied Force revealed that solely using air power may 
ultimately achieve the desired results, but the results will take an extended of time to 
achieve compared to a ground assault.193  
D. NATO’S OPERATION AGAINST LIBYA 
Beyond the concern of NATO’s perceived fracturing, one of the main reason 
NATO decided to get involved in Libya was to protect the general population of Libya 
from harsh reprisals from Qaddafi’s forces.194 Since ground operations were off the table, 
Operation Unified Protector would pit NATO’s planned force of 195 aircraft and 18 ships 
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versus Qaddafi’s 40 jets and 12 ships.195 The extreme imbalance of forces was slightly 
countered by Qaddafi’s ground forces, which included 160 tanks.196 However, due to the 
rise of ideological ideas throughout the Libyan population, Qaddafi could no longer trust 
his troops, and this forced him to hire 25,000 mercenaries to supplement his force.197 
While NATO’s initial aim was to protect civilians, as the operation continued the mission 
slowly and unintentionally began to transition into an operation to implement a regime 
change in Libya.198 This shift occurred in April, when stakeholders in the operation 
(known as the Contact Group) convened and declared, “Qaddafi and his regime had lost 
all legitimacy and he must leave power…Qaddafi’s continued presence would threaten any 
resolution of the crisis.”199 These calls for his removal continued, with the Contact Group 
reiterating his call for removal in May, which coincided with an endorsement for Qaddafi’s 
removal by NATO’s Secretary General.200 While NATO had entered the conflict with 
Kosovo’s air campaign as a playbook, the dynamic in country began to change due to the 
presence of Qaddafi’s ground forces and mercenaries. Without its own ground force, 
NATO had to rely on the opposition’s (the National Transitional Council [NTC]) ground 
elements to provide human intelligence on where NATO’s air assaults could provide the 
best benefits.201 
The situation on the ground between Qaddafi’s forces and the opposition caused 
NATO’s operational tempo to be slowed due to the fighting between the two being in close 
proximity to urban areas and infrastructure.202 According to Barry, “NATO initially 
concentrated on countering the direct threat posed by government troops, particularly their 
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heavy weapons.”203 Barry notes that by July 2011 the British and French began to interpret 
UNSCR 1973’s language differently, resulting in increasingly aggressive strikes against 
Qaddafi’s forces in an attempt to protect civilians.204 As the operation continued, NATO 
air cover assisted in the attrition of Qaddafi’s ground forces, allowing NTC forces to slowly 
gain the upper hand.205 By late August, NTC forces were able to take control of the major 
cities (and Qaddafi strongholds) of Tripoli and Sirte, resulting in Qaddafi going on the run 
and ending with his ultimate capture and execution by NTC elements in October 2011.206 
E. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST NATO’S INVOLVEMENT IN LIBYA 
Before and after the engagement in Libya, supporters and critics offered their opinion 
of NATO’s involvement in an intervention. While many believe that NATO’s involvement 
was justified due to UNSCR 1973’s mandate to protect Libya’s civilians from Qaddafi’s 
wrath while allowing the European militaries to take the lead, others (such as Gomis) felt 
NATO overstepped its boundaries and overstretched itself by taking on an additional mission 
set in addition to its already heavy presence in Afghanistan.207 These arguments and others 
form the main talking points regarding NATO’s Operation Unified Protector. 
1. The Argument for NATO’s Intervention 
The successful deployment of NATO forces in Libya showed that a consortium of 
European partners could successfully lead and win a relatively short military campaign. 
NATO’s response to the situation was largely successful due to the alliance’s ability to 
address the requirements it was charged with in UNSCR 1973, which was to establish a 
no-fly zone, enforce an arms embargo, and protect civilians on the ground.208 Stavridis 
noted the operation was successful due to this accomplishment, which allowed, “the time 
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and space necessary for local forces to overthrow Muammar al-Qaddafi.”209 The role of 
NATO was critical in achieving the three tasks of UNSCR 1973, especially with the 
support provided to the NTC, which was reliant upon NATO’s involvement in order to 
achieve victory.210 These accomplishments provided NATO with tangible evidence for its 
supporters who advocated for its employment in Libya, and quieted critics that felt NATO 
should remain on the sidelines. The accomplishments included the integration of the 
participating NATO members and regional partners under a unified chain of command, 
and an ability for European nations to take a leading role in the operation. 
The assumption of command by NATO allowed for the combination of the various 
nation led campaigns to be brought under the same umbrella. Stavridis writes, “NATO is 
uniquely positioned to respond quickly and effectively to international crises” and, “only 
NATO can provide the common command structure and capabilities necessary to plan and 
execute complex operations.” 211 Stavridis compares NATO’s capabilities to that of a 
cobbled together alliance (such as a coalition of the willing), who,  
Have no common doctrine for conducting military operations, no common 
capabilities or command structure for quickly integrating national forces 
into a cohesive campaign, and no standing mechanisms for debating and 
then deciding on an agreed course of action. Such ad hoc coalitions 
therefore almost always rely disproportionately on a single nation to bear 
the brunt of security burdens that ideally should be more equally shared.212 
Operation Unified Protector showed how the alliance can function and bring in the 
majority of its members into the operational planning process, while also allowing each 
member to bring their specific portion of the alliance to bear against an adversary (an 
example of burden sharing at work). This allowed 14 members of the alliance to integrate 
with one another and coordinate with four additional regional partners while working 
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together under same roof and military framework.213 In addition, OUP proved the alliance 
had the ability to bring the unique capabilities of each participating country into an 
integrated structure, and showed the alliance had additional flexibility outside of the U.S. 
equipment; this demonstrated that NATO was a military and political alliance.214  
The second positive factor in NATO’s involvement in Libya was the opportunity 
for the European nations, especially Great Britain and France, to have an opportunity to 
take the lead in directing operations. Hallams and Schreer note, “the mission demonstrated 
that key European allies such as France and Britain were willing to ‘step up’ and take on a 
greater share of the burden,” and, “in this battle, Europeans took the lead, demonstrating 
that they can and will use force when they have the political will to do so.”215 In addition, 
OUP allowed for European military hardware and capabilities to be showcased while 
allowing the European members an opportunity to identify areas where its military had 
gaps that could be addressed in the future. As noted by Chivvis when discussing the 
European’s leading role, “given the relative success of the operation, the experience of 
Libya is one the alliance should reflect and seek to build upon.”216 
The success of NATO’s military operation in Libya reinforced the belief by 
NATO’s supporters that the alliance has successfully been able to metamorphosize from 
its original goal of providing deterrence against the Soviet Union to, as Stavridis states, 
becoming “the partner of choice for international security operations.”217 All of this was 
done with no losses to NATO personnel throughout the course of Operation Unified 
Protector.218 
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2. Criticism Against NATO’s Intervention 
NATO’s involvement in Libya opened itself to criticism by a plethora of sources 
who believed the alliance was wrong to intervene in another situation outside of Europe, 
especially with the alliance heavily embroiled with operations in Afghanistan (even though 
NATO had the capacity to conduct multiple engagements).219 Critics pointed to the quote 
from NATO’s first secretary general, Lord Hastings Ismay, who said NATO’s purpose was 
to, “keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”220 The criticism 
levied by detractors indicated that the alliance had moved too far beyond its intended 
function and that it has reached a moment when it must conduct a review of the alliance’s 
role moving forward.221 
Regarding its participation in Libya, the first major criticism levied against NATO 
was the concern that the alliance had overstretched itself from both a command and 
resource point of view.222 This view stems from the economic struggles the members were 
facing after the global recession of 2008, which resulted in the cutting of defense budgets 
of the alliance’s members.223 As noted by Gomis, “defense spending by the European 
alliance members declined by more than 45 billion dollars between 2009 and 2011, which 
led U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates to warn that NATO was facing ‘very serious, 
long-term, systematic problems’ because of ‘Europe’s demilitarization’.”224 Gomis notes 
that the United States was also in a budget crisis, noting that then Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen had stated, “the U.S. national debt was the country’s single 
biggest security threat.”225 
Another issue with NATO’s role (and along economic lines) in Libya is the 
perception that NATO had become the protector of the West’s economies, specifically the 
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protector of Wall Street.226 Campbell observes that the mass expansion of NATO from 12 
members in 1991 to 28 members in 2009 was done as a means to protect the globalized 
economies of the larger members and to give the west, “a transnational military force 
capable of intervening in any part of the world to protect ‘investments’ and ‘free 
markets’.”227 Campbell claims that NATO’s main reasoning for getting involved in 
operations outside of Europe is a ruse for western nations to gain a foothold in additional 
territories for financial gain via economic means or new resource acquisition.228 
In terms of the ability for the alliance to take on such a large endeavor without the 
full military support of the United States, some critics point out that the other members of 
NATO had major issues filling in the void left by the United States’ pullback.229 Allin and 
Jones note that the remaining participants were running out of precision guided munitions 
(PGMs) by mid-April, resulting in the U.S. sending in unmanned strike assets (drones) to 
supplement gaps in the alliance’s strike portfolio.230 Erlanger observes that Libya, “has 
been a war where the Danes and Norwegians did an extraordinary number of the combat 
sorties, given their size. Their planes and pilots became exhausted, as the French finally 
pulled back their sole nuclear-powered aircraft carrier for overdue repairs and Italy 
withdrew its aircraft carrier to save money.”231 These topics are concerning if looking at 
it from the angle that the European powers cannot operate a large offensive without full 
U.S. support, especially among critics who feel some NATO partners have taken on an ‘a 
la carte strategy when committing military capabilities to the alliance.232 While burden-
sharing is meant to fill in the gaps of capabilities across the spectrum of the alliance, the 
lack of specialized assets by some countries may lead to an over reliance on the United 
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States, which may not be able to provide the required amount of assets if a similar multi-
campaign situation were to occur in the future. 
In 2011, the United States, like its European partners, was dealing with financial 
woes of its own. The United States faced a challenge itself when it came to PGM allocation, 
especially with the high demand for these weapons in the other conflicts (Iraq and 
Afghanistan) the United States was embroiled in. The common theme of economics comes 
back into the discussion, with the U.S. government struggling to keep the stockpiles full of 
PGMs. Allin and Jones note, “apart from the potential human cost of any combat 
operations, cruise missiles and precision-guided munitions deployed from existing 
stockpiles all have to be replaced. The accuracy such weapons offer comes at a frightening 
time when Democrats and Republicans are threating to shut down the government over a 
difference of a few billion dollars.”233  
The final major criticism of NATO’s intervention in Libya is the lack of consensus 
among the alliance members on whether each would participate or not. Critics note that of 
the 28 members (at that time) of NATO, only eight actively engaged in offensive operations 
against Libya.234 As discussed in Chapter II, Germany decided not to participate but 
allowed its forces within NATO to assist with the operation as necessary. In terms of 
Poland, Chivvis notes that it refrained from employing its fleet of F-16s due to its concern 
over its pilots having the proper training for such an operation.235 Chivvis believes that 
Poland’s excuse not to participate emboldened the other members to find excuses of their 
own to refrain from having to participate.236 This lack of cohesion may have undermined 
the credibility of the alliance on the international stage, possibly showcasing to other 
potential adversaries that NATO was fractured and may be hesitant to fully commit to other 
combat operations.  
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F. JUDGING THE ARGUMENTS 
Each side of the argument for and against NATO’s intervention in Libya provide 
valid arguments. Based on the objectives laid out in UNSCR 1973, NATO’s decision to 
intervene was the correct choice. If NATO decided to stay on the sidelines, the four separate 
operations may have led to confusion among the players as there would not have been a 
single command-and-control infrastructure in place to organize the aircraft and other assets. 
This may have increased the chances of a blue-on-blue situation or resulted in unnecessary 
collateral damage (to include civilian casualties). In addition, the consolidation of 
participating nations under NATO’s roof allowed for the members to see that the 
fragmentation was a negative thing in the long run, as the coalitions of the willing that may 
have formed would not have the same level of cooperation or infrastructure to work with. 
The critics of the campaign offer valid points as well. The concern that NATO was 
overstretching itself was largely dismissed as the assets required for the operation were 
available. The strongest criticism, the concern that the European military budgets did not 
allow for a prolonged operation, proved to be somewhat valid. However, this criticism may 
be used as a learning point for the future. Shortages of PGMs can be addressed for possible 
future operations, especially with the knowledge base that offers data on the rate of 
expenditure of these munitions and the probability that an operation may take longer than 
initially planned. Finally, the concern that the alliance entered the conflict without a 
consensus can also be dismissed. The operation showed that NATO’s role is critical in 
having a central location where the issues of the day, both political and military, can be 
discussed and addressed. If a coalition of the willing conducted the operation, the 
discussions would have taken place in several different locations, possibly in several 
countries and/or time zones. 
Ultimately, the operation was a success and reinvigorated NATO. Nation’s attempting 
to distance themselves from the alliance found that it would be detrimental to their security, 
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especially as the security environment in Europe and the surrounding areas would deteriorate 
with the ongoing Syrian Civil War and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.237 
  
 




The legacy of the intervention in Libya remains to be determined as the outcome of 
the removal of the Qaddafi regime continues to evolve. However, the lessons provided 
from the intervention are important for the members of NATO as these lessons can be 
applied to future NATO operations. This thesis worked to answer the question of what 
compelled the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and ultimately NATO to get 
involved in an intervention against Libya. The research conducted for this thesis revealed 
the political motivations of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany 
and revealed how political motivations played into their ultimate decision of whether or 
not to participate in the intervention in Libya. For those who chose to participate, their 
reasons to do so ranged from the desire to gain political clout in an election year to 
preventing a repeat in history regarding another humanitarian crisis. For Germany, its 
reasons to abstain stemmed from its domestic population’s lack of enthusiasm for further 
military operations by Germany’s armed forces, especially as Germany’s role in 
Afghanistan had gotten increasingly unpopular. The lack of domestic support, combined 
with the previously discussed eleventh hour change of heart by the United States, forced 
the Germans to abstain from the operation. The research also identified the reasoning for 
the United States and the United Kingdom to spurn France’s desire to conduct an 
intervention using a coalition of the willing vice NATO. While France was keen on leading 
such a coalition due to its own political reasons, the United States and United Kingdom felt 
the most efficient means to conduct the operation were through the use of NATO’s 
established command and control capabilities, while allowing the United States the 
opportunity to shift the responsibility onto its European partners. NATO accepted the task 
of assuming the command-and-control functions of the operation due to its own political 
reasons, including its desire to stop the fracturing of the alliance and bring the members 
together under NATO’s auspices as a way to conduct political coordination and 
cooperation. 
The domestic political maneuvering conducted by the various members of NATO 
will continue to pose challenges to the NATO construct as each nation has a different set 
50 
of challenges to deal with regarding their respective populations. As seen in the lead up to 
Libya, neighboring nations such as France and Germany had populations that were on 
opposite ends of the spectrum regarding the matter, thus influencing the course their 
respective nations took. These situations are where NATO can be extremely useful and can 
showcase its superiority over coalitions of the willing, especially if the alliance provides a 
forum for its members to conduct political coordination and cooperation. In addition to 
dealing with the political motivations of its various members, NATO can use this forum to 
bring the alliance closer together in an effort to stamp out talk of separate coalitions of the 
willing that may undermine the larger alliance. Finally, NATO can apply the lessons 
learned of how burden sharing affected operations in Libya and how these lessons can be 
used to identify the utility of burden sharing going forward and how it may be adjusted to 
the betterment of the alliance. 
A. UTILIZING NATO FOR POLITICAL COORDINATION  
As the research demonstrated, the lessons learned from the intervention against 
Libya are important to remember for future operations. One of the most glaring issues with 
Operation Unified Protector was the lack of a clear strategy. As noted in Chapter III, the 
initial aim of the intervention in Libya was to prevent the Qaddafi regime from conducting 
genocide against the opposition, using UNSCR 1973 as the guiding principle. In the leadup 
to the intervention, the French desire to lead a coalition of the willing showed the 
fragmentation that was apparent among the alliance at that time. If the French had been 
successful in their venture, even if it was a coalition between the French and the British 
through their defense treaty, the outcome of the operation may have been in doubt due to 
the lack of resource available to them for an extended operation.  
The use of a no-fly zone demonstrated the limitations of an all-air campaign. As 
noted by Metz, air power is limited in a campaign because, “an irregular force can disperse, 
go to ground, and wait out the storm, then reconstitute and resume operations. Nor can air 
51 
attacks be sustained at a ‘shock and awe’ level for a protracted length of time.”238 In 
addition, Metz observes, “airpower cannot control territory or populations on its own or 
stabilize a post-conflict state to pave the way for long-term stability.”239 He notes that the 
only effective means to accomplish these goals is through the deployment of ground troops. 
If the participating countries believed that Qaddafi’s forces would be persuaded to seize 
their actions due to a shock and awe over the course of a few days their hopes were dashed 
quickly, leading to an extended period of bombing and ultimately to shortages of munitions 
among the European members.240 
The discussion over the utility of a no-fly zone is a perfect example of how the 
alliance can use NATO as a forum to discuss such matters. Instead of allowing the debate 
to occur within the various members’ war rooms and instead occur within the chambers of 
NATO HQ. This would have nipped the conversation in the bud much sooner, showcasing 
how any sort of no-fly zone would require the participation of a majority of the alliance 
due to its reliance on burden sharing. A coalition of the willing may not have had the 
prerequisite equipment to effectively defeat Libya’s air defense systems without the 
participation of the United States, which is able to bring specialized equipment to a conflict 
that the other members do not have.241  
Another attribute to using NATO as a forum for coordination and cooperation is 
the ability to develop strategy for operations under the same roof. This would prevent a 
repeat of the early phases of the intervention, when the four concurrent operations were 
being conducted by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada. The 
deployment of military forces by several countries, without coordination, can lead to 
mishaps in the field and increase potential collateral damage risks to innocent civilians on 
the ground. By coordinating with each other at NATO HQ, operations can be streamlined 
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beforehand and allow for an operation to be conducted under the purview of a unified chain 
of command. This contrasts greatly with a coalition of the willing, which would not have 
the same level of coordination and integration and may lead to more gaps in military 
capabilities due to the concept of burden sharing not being effectively implemented among 
the willing members. 
The idea of using NATO as a means for political coordination and cooperation are 
key recommendations in NATO’s report titled, “NATO 2030: United for a New Era.” 242 
The report notes that it may become more difficult for the alliance to reach a consensus 
due to the variety of threats that each member faces individually (and may not be shared 
by other members).243 However, it notes that variety of threats faced by each member 
makes the existence of NATO more relevant due to the protection the alliance offers. The 
report also addresses the dangers of fracturing among the alliance due to the ability of 
adversaries to take advantage of these fragmented sections, thus reducing the effectiveness 
of the collective defense.244 The report’s main finding states, 
The overarching political objective for NATO must be to consolidate the 
transatlantic Alliance to ensure that it possesses the tools, cohesion, and 
consultative attributes to provide collective defense in this more challenging 
landscape. NATO’s political dimension must adapt in order to maintain and 
strengthen its efficiency as well as ensuring its relevance for all allies. 
B. ADDRESSING THE SHORTCOMINGS OF BURDEN SHARING  
Operation Unified Protector offers the most recent evidence of how burden sharing 
is working within NATO. As previously discussed, OUP came on the heels of the global 
recession of the late aughts. Each member nation faced budget shortfalls due to the 
recession, exacerbating the funding shortcomings of some members prior to the recession. 
The extended operations caused by the refusal of the Qaddafi regime to relent and the 
ultimate shift from a humanitarian mission to a regime change mission, brought these 
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shortcomings to light. As noted in Chapter III, the stockpiles of PGMs were exhausted and 
several participating nations had to recall forces due to funding concerns.245 It can be 
argued that the prevalence of burden shifting among the alliance led to such shortcomings. 
OUP was unique in that the United States did not provide offensive forces for much of the 
operation, and only rejoined offensive operations once the European members began to run 
low on PGMs. 
The question of burden sharing among NATO allies will continue to be a hotly 
debated topic. However, the initial portion of Operation Unified Protector proved that 
burden sharing did work. It was not until the operation extended beyond what was initially 
expected did the issue of munition expenditure and overall finances become an issue. These 
issues bring back the comparison to France’s initial desire to conduct a coalition of the 
willing. If France had succeeded in obtaining such a coalition, the issues of munition 
expenditures, wear and tear on equipment, and pilot fatigue (as mentioned in Chapter III) 
would have increased exponentially due to the operation being conducted by a smaller 
force. In addition, if a coalition had been formed without the United States’ participation, 
the ability to ask for drone support may not have been possible (or at least severely 
delayed).  
Despite the shortcomings of burden sharing, OUP showed the benefits of the 
construct and offered data points to the alliance on where there were shortcomings in the 
collective defense construct. These lessons would be important due to the events of 2014, 
when Russian forces conducted a surprise invasion into the Ukraine.246 This action was an 
impetus for the alliance to agree to stop the decline in defense funding and to pledge two 
percent of their respective gross domestic product toward defense.247 This pledge allows 
for the fielding of new technology throughout the alliance, such as Britain’s two Queen 
Elizabeth class aircraft carriers (the second ship, the HMS Prince of Wales, was on the 
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chopping block prior to the summit).248 While the United Kingdom has traditionally spent 
above the two percent goal, other countries such as Germany have increased defense 
spending in recent years, with its 2021 expenditures on defense rising to 1.57% of GDP 
compared to 1.36% in 2020.249 The positive effects of the Wales Summit on burden 
sharing was mentioned in NATO 2030, “the pledge represents an unwavering commitment 
of each Ally toward collective defense, and the Allies have made substantial efforts toward 
fairer burden-sharing since these goals were set.”250 
Ultimately, the alliance must continue to work together to identify the best way to 
make burden sharing work for the future. If the alliance is to survive and thrive in the 
future, it would be wise for the members to identify what the collective defense should 
look like and leverage the burden sharing construct to ensure that the alliance can field a 
formidable force against aggressors and without glaring holes that could be exploited or 
shortcomings that may undermine the effectiveness of the alliance. 
C. FINAL THOUGHTS 
With the 10th anniversary of OUP occurring this year, the current political situation 
among the alliance’s members bears similarities to the political situation of 2010. The onset 
of the global coronavirus-19 (COVID-19) pandemic may pose similar issues to the bottom 
line of the defense departments of the various alliance members as they address the 
financial fallout of the pandemic in the coming years. The financial recovery experienced 
by the European members from 2015–2019 may ultimately be for naught if the fallout from 
the pandemic results in new cuts to defense spending. As noted by Marcos, “it took until 
2018, 10 years after the outbreak of the crisis, for defense expenditures in Europe to recover 
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their pre-crisis levels, which were already low.” 251 These low levels were the result of 
post-Cold War budget reductions, which former NATO Secretary General Rasmussen 
equated to “a point when you are no longer cutting fat; you’re cutting into muscle, and then 
into bone.”252 However, the political environment faced in a post-COVID world may make 
it difficult for the alliance to continue on the path toward the two percent goal as some 
political organizations work to shift defense funding into other social programs to help 
their citizens recover from the effects of the pandemic.253 
NATO’s 2030 report offers an opinion on COVID-19 and how it may affect the 
alliance, stating that  
the COVID-19 crisis has demonstrated, in dramatic and unexpected fashion, 
the deleterious effects that pandemics can have not only to the public health 
of NATO citizenries but to social resilience and security, both by 
reorienting policy attention and scarce resources, and fueling international 
rivalry and confrontation. It has accelerated the digitalization of NATO 
societies and, in the coming years, could reduce defense spending.254 
The ramifications of COVID-19 may cause a lasting effect on the bottom line of 
the alliances various defense departments as the Great Recession did previously. However, 
the threat of a resurgent Russia is the main difference from what NATO was facing in 2010. 
This leads to some additional questions for further research. First, will NATO’s members 
be able to reach the defense spending goals established at the 2014 Wales Summit, or will 
the post COVID-19 world make it too difficult or politically challenging to allocate the 
appropriate funds to the alliance? Second, will the alliance’s members utilize burden 
sharing effectively to identify the best ways to appropriate funds toward filling in gaps in 
the collective defense the alliance provides? These questions are important in identifying 
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how the alliance can adjust to the new environment and address the ongoing question of 
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